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Here are the advantages that were obtained by Saddam Hussein in negotiations with United Nations 
(UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan. (1) The United States Government (USG) will continue to expend 
treasure through the deployment of additional military forces throughout the Mideast. The longer the 
forces remain, the greater the probability of exacerbating anti-USG sentiment throughout local 
populations. The longer the forces remain, the more other USG security imperatives are given short 
shrift. (2) Saddam has succeeded in changing the terms of resolutions to which the Iraqi Government 
was forced to agree after the Persian Gulf War. (3) Only the many Iraqis who are not part of Saddam 
Hussein's power infrastructure have suffered for Saddam's many violations of UN resolutions. (4) 
Saddam has won another "Great Victory"--at least in the eyes of many in the Mideast--by once again 
going eyeball to eyeball with world's only super power. Sure, maybe he blinked. But he has still survived, 
while most other Mideast leaders appear terrified to confront the USG. (5) Although the new agreement 
will be subject to verification, its signing is literally an encomium to Saddam's word--as if past violations 
of resolutions has not tarnished it. (6) Time is on Saddam's side, and he has bought additional time 
during which international support for rigid sanctions and inspections will ineluctably decrease. (7) 
Sooner or later, the USG will be confronted with the decision of when enough is enough and military 
forces need to be moved elsewhere. As soon as this happens, the iron fist behind the velvet glove of 
diplomacy is gone. Even if the USG unilaterally decides to attack Iraq, even more time will be necessary 
before the attack can be launched. (8) The UN sanctions-ending criteria of no weapons of mass 
destruction, no means to develop them, and no existing delivery vehicles can never be met due to their 
very nature--especially biological warfare assets. Even if the UN Special Commission formally certifies 
that Iraq has met the criteria, the operational truth may be quite different. And if this truth is discovered 
after sanctions have been lifted, the possibility of UN approval of new sanctions will be extremely low. 
So will support for virtually unilateral USG military intervention. (9) With each crisis, Saddam has bought 
more time to hide, transfer, and develop proscribed assets. He has done so once again and has only 
been coerced into agreeing to do what was agreed on back in 1991. (10) The new agreement actually 
results in a UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) command and coordination structure 
that facilitates poor communication, personality conflicts, administrative snafus, and the like that can be 
exploited by Saddam into UN and IAEA violations of the new agreement that can, in turn, be righteously 
abrogated. (11) The myth of UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) effectiveness in locating and destroying 
biological warfare (BW) assets has been reinforced by Saddam to his advantage. In actuality, the 
defection of a son-in-law--Hussein Kamal, now deceased--may well have had more to do with significant 
BW identification and potential destruction than the UNSCOM process. Unfortunately, other close 
relatives may view the deceased not as calls to glory but to action. Unfortunately, UNSCOM may be 
forced to eventually give Saddam a clean bill of health in the absence of discovered assets not existing 
ones. Another Great Victory in the Mother of All Battles for Saddam. (See Akehurst, L., Kohnken, G., Vrij, 
A., & Bull, R. (1996). Lay persons' and police officers' beliefs regarding deceptive behaviour. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 10, 461-471; Hala, S., & Chandler, M. (1996). The role of strategic planning in 
accessing false-belief understanding. Child Development, 67, 2948-2966; Recent IBPP articles on Iraq by 
using the keyword feature at the IBPP website; Text of the United Nations-Iraq Agreement. (February 
24, 1998). The New York Times, (http://www.nytimes.com)).  
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